CURRICULUM VITAE Ming Tan Education 2000-2006: PhD, Philosophy (Thesis Title: An Analysis of Teleological Theories of Mental Content), University of Melbourne. 1996-1999: Bachelor of Arts (Hons.), Philosophy, Monash University. Area of Specialisation Philosophy of Mind Areas of Competence Metaphysics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language Conference Presentations ‘Teleosemantics and the Distality Problem’, Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, RMIT University, July 2008. ‘Intentional Icons’, Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, University of Sydney, July 2005. ‘Some Objections to Teleosemantics Answered’, Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, South Molle Island, July 2004. ‘Three Responses to the Indeterminacy Problem for Teleosemantics’, Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, University of Adelaide, July 2003. ‘A Teleological Response to Swampman’, 8th Australasian Philosophy Postgraduate Conference, University of New England, September 2002. ‘The Status of Teleological Theories of Content’, Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, University of Canterbury, July 2002. Teaching Experience 2009, Tutor, Philosophy of Mind, Monash University 2008, Tutor, Philosophy of Mind, Monash University 2008, Tutor, Introduction to Philosophy A, Monash University 2007, Tutor, Philosophy of Mind, Monash University 2007 Tutor, Introduction to Philosophy A, Monash University 2005, Tutor, Philosophy of Mind, Monash University 2003, Tutor, Global Justice and Human Rights, University of Melbourne Awards 2008, Dean’s Commendation of Excellence in Teaching, Faculty of Arts, Monash University. Professional Service 2009, Editor, ‘Teleological Accounts of Mental Content’ PhilPapers: Online Research in Philosophy. Thesis Summary The concern of this thesis is with the following question: in virtue of what do a human agent’s beliefs and desires have the contents that they have? In this thesis, we will argue that there is a theory that provides an answer to this question. We begin by laying down a set of adequacy criteria for a successful theory of content. These are: the naturalism criterion, the criterion of accounting for the content of each and every mental state type, and the criterion of solving the misrepresentation, indeterminacy, and disjunction problems. We then narrow down the list of candidate theories that can provide a satisfactory answer. The theories that emerge as the two best candidates to deliver a successful theory of content are the teleological theories of content put forward by David Papineau, and Ruth Millikan, respectively. The central notion in teleological theories is that of biological function. After introducing the etiological account of function to which these theories subscribe, we address two challenges to the biological respectability of the etiological account, and conclude that the account is able to overcome them. In the course of this discussion, we also lay down a set of adequacy criteria for the successful application of etiological accounts to teleological theories. Having introduced the main features of Papineau’s teleological theory, as well as flagging some potential areas of concern for his theory, we address two objections to it – the ‘Swampman’ objection, and the problem of accounting for the contents of ‘novel’ beliefs and desires, respectively. We conclude that the theory fails to overcome the second of these objections, and therefore, that it drops out of the running to deliver a successful theory of content. We then introduce Millikan’s very different theoretical framework – including some preliminary worries for the theory, as well as flagging the theoretical resources that she deploys in responding to objections. Finally, Millikan’s theory is put to the test against six different objections. The majority of these are directed at her theoretical framework, while the others are directed at independent theses – adaptationism, metaphysical realism – to which her theory is committed. We conclude that her theory has the resources to overcome each of these objections. The final conclusion of the thesis is that Millikan’s theory delivers a successful theory of content, because it meets the criteria of adequacy and overcomes a number of serious objections.