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Jakob Hohwy

Monash University, Philosophy, Faculty Member

443 Followers 79 Following 13 Co-authorsTotal Views

Papers

Zoomed out? Depersonalization is Related to Increased Digital Media Use During the COVID-19 Pandemic Lockdown

by Vittorio Gallese, Mateusz Wozniak, and Jakob Hohwy

Preprint, 2021

Depersonalisation is a common dissociative experience characterised by distressing feelings of be... more Depersonalisation is a common dissociative experience characterised by distressing feelings of being detached or 'estranged' from one's self and body and/or the world. The COVID-19 pandemic forced millions of people to socially distance from others and to change life habits. We have conducted an online study on 622 participants worldwide to investigate the relationship between digital media-based activities and distal social interactions in influencing peoples' sense of self during the lockdown as opposed to before the pandemic. We found that increased use of digital media-based activities and online social e-meetings correlated with higher feelings of depersonalisation. We also found that people reporting higher experiences of depersonalisation also reported enhanced vividness of negative emotions (as opposed to positive emotions). Our study also reveals a weak negative correlation between the frequency of physical exercise during the lockdown and the occurrence of depersonalisation experiences. Finally, participants who reported that lockdown influenced their life to greater extent had higher occurrences of depersonalisation experiences. Our findings may help address key questions regarding well-being during a lockdown, in the general population. Our study points to potential risks related to an overly sedentary and hyper-digitalized life habits that may induce feelings of living in one's 'head' (mind), disconnected from one's body, self and the world.

Fidgeting as self-evidencing: A predictive processing account of non-goal-directed action

by Kelsey Perrykkad and Jakob Hohwy

New Ideas in Psychology, 2020

Non-goal-directed actions have been relatively neglected in cognitive science, but are ubiquitous... more Non-goal-directed actions have been relatively neglected in cognitive science, but are ubiquitous and related to important cognitive functions. Fidgeting is seemingly one subtype of non-goal-directed action which is ripe for a functional account. What's the point of fidgeting? The predictive processing framework is a parsimonious account of brain function which says the brain aims to minimise the difference between expected and actual states of the world and itself, that is, minimise prediction error. This framework situates action selection in terms of active inference for expected states. However, seemingly aimless, idle actions, such as fidgeting, are a challenge to such theories. When our actions are not obviously goal-achieving, how can a predictive processing framework explain why we regularly do them anyway? Here, we argue that in a predictive processing framework, evidence for the agent's own existence is consolidated by self-stimulation or fidgeting. Endogenous, repetitive actions reduce uncertainty about the system's own states, and thus help continuously maintain expected rates of prediction error minimisation. We extend this explanation to clinically distinctive self-stimulation, such as in Autism Spectrum Conditions, in which effective strategies for self-evidencing may be different to the neurotypical case.

Reforming the Taxonomy in Disorders of Consciousness

by Tim Bayne and Jakob Hohwy

This article examines the serious shortcomings that characterize the current taxonomy of postcoma... more This article examines the serious shortcomings that characterize the current taxonomy of postcomatose disorders of consciousness (DoC), and it provides guidelines for how an improved DoC taxonomy might be developed. In particular , it is argued that behavioral criteria for the application of DoC categories should be supplemented with brain-based criteria (eg, information derived from electroencephalography and functional magnetic resonance imaging), and that the categorical framework that currently characterizes DoC should be replaced by a multidimensional framework that better captures the performance of patients across a range of cognitive and behavioural tasks.

Seeing it both ways. Forthcoming in JEP:HPP 1 Seeing it both ways: Using a double-cueing task to investigate the role of spatial cueing in level-1 visual perspective-taking

by John Michael, Thomas Wolf, and Jakob Hohwy

Previous research using the dot perspective task has produced evidence that humans may be equippe... more Previous research using the dot perspective task has produced evidence that humans may be equipped with a mechanism that spontaneously tracks others' gaze direction and thereby acquires information about what they can see. Other findings, however, support the alternative hypothesis that a spatial cuing mechanism underpins the effect observed in the dot perspective task. In order to adjudicate between these hypotheses, we developed a double-cuing version of Posner's (1980) spatial cueing paradigm to be implemented in the dot perspective task, and conducted three experiments in which we manipulated stimulus onset asynchrony as well as secondary task demands. Crucially, the two conflicting hypotheses generate divergent patterns of predictions across these experimental conditions. Our results support the hypothesis of an automatic perspective-taking mechanism.

Individual Differences in Moral Behaviour: A Role for Response to Risk and Uncertainty?

by Trung Ngo and Jakob Hohwy

Neuroethics, 2013

Are There Levels of Consciousness?

by Jakob Hohwy and Tim Bayne

The notion of a level of consciousness is a key construct in the science of consciousness. Not on... more The notion of a level of consciousness is a key construct in the science of consciousness. Not only is the term employed to describe the global states of consciousness that are associated with post-comatose disorders, epileptic absence seizures, anaesthesia, and sleep, it plays an increasingly influential role in theoretical and methodological contexts. However, it is far from clear what precisely a level of consciousness is supposed to be. This paper argues that the levels-based framework for conceptualizing global states of consciousness is untenable and develops in its place a multidimensional account of global states. Two Aspects of Consciousness Consciousness is typically taken to have two aspects: local states (see Glossary) and global states. Local states of consciousness include perceptual experiences of various kinds, imagery experiences, bodily sensations, affective experiences, and occurrent thoughts. In the science of consciousness local states are usually referred to as 'conscious contents', for they are typically distinguished from each other on the basis of the objects and features that they represent. By contrast, global states of consciousness are not typically distinguished from each other on the basis of the objects or features that are represented in experience. Instead, they are typically distinguished from each other on cognitive, behavioural, and physiological grounds. For example, the global state associated with alert wakefulness is distinguished from the global states that are associated with post-comatose conditions such as the vegetative state (VS) and the minimally conscious state (MCS), and these states are themselves distinguished from the states that are associated with light-to-moderate degrees of sedation, dreaming, hypnosis, and epileptic absence seizures. Compared with the amount of attention that has been devoted to the contents of consciousness , global states of consciousness have been relatively neglected (although see [1–6]). This neglect might be justified if the notion played only a marginal role in the science of consciousness , but it is puzzling given the increasing prominence of global states in consciousness studies. The neglect of global states might also be justified if their nature was self-evident, but that is not the case either. Indeed, the standard conception of global states equates them with 'levels of consciousness', but it is far from clear what a level of consciousness is supposed to be. This paper argues that the levels-based conceptions of global states of consciousness is untenable, and offers in its place a multidimensional analysis of global states.

Consciousness: Theoretical Approaches

Neuroimaging of Consciousness, 2013

It’s beginning to look a lot like my hand: Fake hand perceived to resemble own hand for people with body dysmorphic disorder but not controls

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 2012

Cognitive neuropsychiatry 8: 237–242, 2003

The neural correlates of consciousness: Room for improvement, but on the right track: Comment

UCL logo UCL Discovery. ...

Is Body Dysmorphic Disorder Associated with Abnormal Bodily Self-Awareness? A Study Using the Rubber Hand Illusion

PLoS ONE, 2014

Individual Differences in Moral Behaviour: A Role for Response to Risk and Uncertainty?

Neuroethics, 2013

Phenomenal Variability and Introspective Reliability

Mind & Language, 2011

Abstract: There is surprising evidence that introspection of our phenomenal states varies greatly... more Abstract: There is surprising evidence that introspection of our phenomenal states varies greatly between individuals and within the same individual over time. This puts pressure on the notion that introspection gives reliable access to our own phenomenology: introspective unreliability would explain the variability, while assuming that the underlying phenomenology is stable. I appeal to a body of neurocomputational, Bayesian theory and neuroimaging findings to provide an alternative explanation of the evidence: though some ...

Elusive phenomenology, counterfactual awareness, and presence without mastery

Cognitive Neuroscience, 2014

Seth&amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;s counterfactual-based predictive processing account of presence is ... more Seth&amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;s counterfactual-based predictive processing account of presence is compelling and innovative; it gives a new, deeper understanding of a critical aspect of our phenomenology. Remaining in overall agreement with Seth&amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;s use of the prediction error minimization framework, I consider the elusive concept of presence, I probe the exact role of counterfactuals in the phenomenology of presence, and I suggest that some aspects of sense of presence can be accounted for by hierarchical inference without direct appeal to predictive processing of sensorimotor contingencies.

Capture of kinesthesis by a competing cutaneous input

Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 2012

In four experiments, blindfolded participants were presented with pairs of stimuli simultaneously... more In four experiments, blindfolded participants were presented with pairs of stimuli simultaneously, one to each index finger. Participants moved one index finger, which was presented with cutaneous and/or kinesthetic stimuli, and this movement caused a raised line to move underneath the other, stationary index finger in a yoked manner. The stimuli were 180º rotations of each other (e.g., &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt; and &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;gt;), and thus when a &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt; was traced with the moving finger, it caused a &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;gt; to be felt at the stationary finger. When asked to report the experience, participants predominantly reported the cutaneous stimulus, seemingly being ignorant of the kinesthetic stimulus. This appears to be an intrahaptic capture phenomenon, which is of interest because it suggests that conflict between intrahaptic sensory stimuli can go unnoticed; sometimes we are unaware of how we moved, and sometimes we do not know what we touched. The results are interpreted in light of optimal integration, perceptual suppression, reafference suppression, and inattentional blindness.

Studies of the neural correlates of consciousness can do better, but are on the right track

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2004

Home Home. ...

The Nature of Consciousness, by Mark Rowlands

This site is powered by the VTLS VITAL repository solution.

When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts. By G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham.(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press 2000. Pp xii+ 198)

SATS, Apr 16, 2010

Predictive coding and binocular rivalry

i-Perception, 2011

The notion of unconscious perceptual inference, particularly in the shape of predictive coding, p... more The notion of unconscious perceptual inference, particularly in the shape of predictive coding, promises to address many of the problems of visual perception that has long preoccupied philosophy. The dichoptic viewing conditions during binocular rivalry presents an extreme example of the epistemic task confronting perceptual inference and rivalry is therefore an important test-case for the predictive coding framework. This talk explores what predictive coding can and cannot tell us about the mechanism behind rivalry. The guiding ...

Zoomed out? Depersonalization is Related to Increased Digital Media Use During the COVID-19 Pandemic Lockdown

by Vittorio Gallese, Mateusz Wozniak, and Jakob Hohwy

Preprint, 2021

Depersonalisation is a common dissociative experience characterised by distressing feelings of be... more Depersonalisation is a common dissociative experience characterised by distressing feelings of being detached or 'estranged' from one's self and body and/or the world. The COVID-19 pandemic forced millions of people to socially distance from others and to change life habits. We have conducted an online study on 622 participants worldwide to investigate the relationship between digital media-based activities and distal social interactions in influencing peoples' sense of self during the lockdown as opposed to before the pandemic. We found that increased use of digital media-based activities and online social e-meetings correlated with higher feelings of depersonalisation. We also found that people reporting higher experiences of depersonalisation also reported enhanced vividness of negative emotions (as opposed to positive emotions). Our study also reveals a weak negative correlation between the frequency of physical exercise during the lockdown and the occurrence of depersonalisation experiences. Finally, participants who reported that lockdown influenced their life to greater extent had higher occurrences of depersonalisation experiences. Our findings may help address key questions regarding well-being during a lockdown, in the general population. Our study points to potential risks related to an overly sedentary and hyper-digitalized life habits that may induce feelings of living in one's 'head' (mind), disconnected from one's body, self and the world.

Fidgeting as self-evidencing: A predictive processing account of non-goal-directed action

by Kelsey Perrykkad and Jakob Hohwy

New Ideas in Psychology, 2020

Non-goal-directed actions have been relatively neglected in cognitive science, but are ubiquitous... more Non-goal-directed actions have been relatively neglected in cognitive science, but are ubiquitous and related to important cognitive functions. Fidgeting is seemingly one subtype of non-goal-directed action which is ripe for a functional account. What's the point of fidgeting? The predictive processing framework is a parsimonious account of brain function which says the brain aims to minimise the difference between expected and actual states of the world and itself, that is, minimise prediction error. This framework situates action selection in terms of active inference for expected states. However, seemingly aimless, idle actions, such as fidgeting, are a challenge to such theories. When our actions are not obviously goal-achieving, how can a predictive processing framework explain why we regularly do them anyway? Here, we argue that in a predictive processing framework, evidence for the agent's own existence is consolidated by self-stimulation or fidgeting. Endogenous, repetitive actions reduce uncertainty about the system's own states, and thus help continuously maintain expected rates of prediction error minimisation. We extend this explanation to clinically distinctive self-stimulation, such as in Autism Spectrum Conditions, in which effective strategies for self-evidencing may be different to the neurotypical case.

Reforming the Taxonomy in Disorders of Consciousness

by Tim Bayne and Jakob Hohwy

This article examines the serious shortcomings that characterize the current taxonomy of postcoma... more This article examines the serious shortcomings that characterize the current taxonomy of postcomatose disorders of consciousness (DoC), and it provides guidelines for how an improved DoC taxonomy might be developed. In particular , it is argued that behavioral criteria for the application of DoC categories should be supplemented with brain-based criteria (eg, information derived from electroencephalography and functional magnetic resonance imaging), and that the categorical framework that currently characterizes DoC should be replaced by a multidimensional framework that better captures the performance of patients across a range of cognitive and behavioural tasks.

Seeing it both ways. Forthcoming in JEP:HPP 1 Seeing it both ways: Using a double-cueing task to investigate the role of spatial cueing in level-1 visual perspective-taking

by John Michael, Thomas Wolf, and Jakob Hohwy

Previous research using the dot perspective task has produced evidence that humans may be equippe... more Previous research using the dot perspective task has produced evidence that humans may be equipped with a mechanism that spontaneously tracks others' gaze direction and thereby acquires information about what they can see. Other findings, however, support the alternative hypothesis that a spatial cuing mechanism underpins the effect observed in the dot perspective task. In order to adjudicate between these hypotheses, we developed a double-cuing version of Posner's (1980) spatial cueing paradigm to be implemented in the dot perspective task, and conducted three experiments in which we manipulated stimulus onset asynchrony as well as secondary task demands. Crucially, the two conflicting hypotheses generate divergent patterns of predictions across these experimental conditions. Our results support the hypothesis of an automatic perspective-taking mechanism.

Individual Differences in Moral Behaviour: A Role for Response to Risk and Uncertainty?

by Trung Ngo and Jakob Hohwy

Neuroethics, 2013

Are There Levels of Consciousness?

by Jakob Hohwy and Tim Bayne

The notion of a level of consciousness is a key construct in the science of consciousness. Not on... more The notion of a level of consciousness is a key construct in the science of consciousness. Not only is the term employed to describe the global states of consciousness that are associated with post-comatose disorders, epileptic absence seizures, anaesthesia, and sleep, it plays an increasingly influential role in theoretical and methodological contexts. However, it is far from clear what precisely a level of consciousness is supposed to be. This paper argues that the levels-based framework for conceptualizing global states of consciousness is untenable and develops in its place a multidimensional account of global states. Two Aspects of Consciousness Consciousness is typically taken to have two aspects: local states (see Glossary) and global states. Local states of consciousness include perceptual experiences of various kinds, imagery experiences, bodily sensations, affective experiences, and occurrent thoughts. In the science of consciousness local states are usually referred to as 'conscious contents', for they are typically distinguished from each other on the basis of the objects and features that they represent. By contrast, global states of consciousness are not typically distinguished from each other on the basis of the objects or features that are represented in experience. Instead, they are typically distinguished from each other on cognitive, behavioural, and physiological grounds. For example, the global state associated with alert wakefulness is distinguished from the global states that are associated with post-comatose conditions such as the vegetative state (VS) and the minimally conscious state (MCS), and these states are themselves distinguished from the states that are associated with light-to-moderate degrees of sedation, dreaming, hypnosis, and epileptic absence seizures. Compared with the amount of attention that has been devoted to the contents of consciousness , global states of consciousness have been relatively neglected (although see [1–6]). This neglect might be justified if the notion played only a marginal role in the science of consciousness , but it is puzzling given the increasing prominence of global states in consciousness studies. The neglect of global states might also be justified if their nature was self-evident, but that is not the case either. Indeed, the standard conception of global states equates them with 'levels of consciousness', but it is far from clear what a level of consciousness is supposed to be. This paper argues that the levels-based conceptions of global states of consciousness is untenable, and offers in its place a multidimensional analysis of global states.

Consciousness: Theoretical Approaches

Neuroimaging of Consciousness, 2013

It’s beginning to look a lot like my hand: Fake hand perceived to resemble own hand for people with body dysmorphic disorder but not controls

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 2012

Cognitive neuropsychiatry 8: 237–242, 2003

The neural correlates of consciousness: Room for improvement, but on the right track: Comment

UCL logo UCL Discovery. ...

Is Body Dysmorphic Disorder Associated with Abnormal Bodily Self-Awareness? A Study Using the Rubber Hand Illusion

PLoS ONE, 2014

Individual Differences in Moral Behaviour: A Role for Response to Risk and Uncertainty?

Neuroethics, 2013

Phenomenal Variability and Introspective Reliability

Mind & Language, 2011

Abstract: There is surprising evidence that introspection of our phenomenal states varies greatly... more Abstract: There is surprising evidence that introspection of our phenomenal states varies greatly between individuals and within the same individual over time. This puts pressure on the notion that introspection gives reliable access to our own phenomenology: introspective unreliability would explain the variability, while assuming that the underlying phenomenology is stable. I appeal to a body of neurocomputational, Bayesian theory and neuroimaging findings to provide an alternative explanation of the evidence: though some ...

Elusive phenomenology, counterfactual awareness, and presence without mastery

Cognitive Neuroscience, 2014

Seth&amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;s counterfactual-based predictive processing account of presence is ... more Seth&amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;s counterfactual-based predictive processing account of presence is compelling and innovative; it gives a new, deeper understanding of a critical aspect of our phenomenology. Remaining in overall agreement with Seth&amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;s use of the prediction error minimization framework, I consider the elusive concept of presence, I probe the exact role of counterfactuals in the phenomenology of presence, and I suggest that some aspects of sense of presence can be accounted for by hierarchical inference without direct appeal to predictive processing of sensorimotor contingencies.

Capture of kinesthesis by a competing cutaneous input

Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 2012

In four experiments, blindfolded participants were presented with pairs of stimuli simultaneously... more In four experiments, blindfolded participants were presented with pairs of stimuli simultaneously, one to each index finger. Participants moved one index finger, which was presented with cutaneous and/or kinesthetic stimuli, and this movement caused a raised line to move underneath the other, stationary index finger in a yoked manner. The stimuli were 180º rotations of each other (e.g., &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt; and &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;gt;), and thus when a &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt; was traced with the moving finger, it caused a &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;gt; to be felt at the stationary finger. When asked to report the experience, participants predominantly reported the cutaneous stimulus, seemingly being ignorant of the kinesthetic stimulus. This appears to be an intrahaptic capture phenomenon, which is of interest because it suggests that conflict between intrahaptic sensory stimuli can go unnoticed; sometimes we are unaware of how we moved, and sometimes we do not know what we touched. The results are interpreted in light of optimal integration, perceptual suppression, reafference suppression, and inattentional blindness.

Studies of the neural correlates of consciousness can do better, but are on the right track

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2004

Home Home. ...

The Nature of Consciousness, by Mark Rowlands

This site is powered by the VTLS VITAL repository solution.

When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts. By G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham.(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press 2000. Pp xii+ 198)

SATS, Apr 16, 2010

Predictive coding and binocular rivalry

i-Perception, 2011

The notion of unconscious perceptual inference, particularly in the shape of predictive coding, p... more The notion of unconscious perceptual inference, particularly in the shape of predictive coding, promises to address many of the problems of visual perception that has long preoccupied philosophy. The dichoptic viewing conditions during binocular rivalry presents an extreme example of the epistemic task confronting perceptual inference and rivalry is therefore an important test-case for the predictive coding framework. This talk explores what predictive coding can and cannot tell us about the mechanism behind rivalry. The guiding ...

Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition

by Enrico Terrone, John Michael, John Searle, Brian Epstein, and Jakob Hohwy

Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition brings together contributions from researche... more Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition brings together contributions from researchers with a highly diverse range of disciplinary backgrounds – from philosophy to anthropology, economics, psychology, neurosci- ence and linguistics. Although the concepts and the methods that shape their contributions differ greatly, one thing that they all share in common is that they have been inspired in one way or another (indeed, in many ways) by John Searle’s pioneering and foundational work in the philosophy of language and mind and, more recently, society.
The project of editing a collection of essays on some of the most pressing and fascinating questions in current research on social ontology and social cognition started to take shape at the Interacting Minds Centre at the University of Aarhus in Summer 2011. Some of the essays included in this volume were first presented in the context of Objects in Mind, the first Aarhus-Paris conference on social ontol- ogy and social cognition, which was held at the Centre of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience at the University of Aarhus on June 25–26, 2012.

The Predictive Mind

Representation in the Prediction Error Minimization Framework

by Alex B Kiefer and Jakob Hohwy

Content and Misrepresentation in Hierarchical Generative Models

by Alex B Kiefer and Jakob Hohwy

In this paper, we develop a representationalist interpretation of the generative models posited i... more In this paper, we develop a representationalist interpretation of the generative models posited in recent neo-Helmholtzian theories of perception and cognition. We build on existing treatments of representation as structural resemblance, and argue that the structural representation proposal has more in common with functional-role than with causal/informational or teleosemantic theories. In the remainder of the paper, we describe the prediction error minimization (PEM) framework for approximate Bayesian inference in some detail, and discuss how structural representations might arise within the proposed Bayesian hierarchies. After explicating the notion of variational inference, we define a subjectively accessible measure of misrepresentation for hierarchical Bayesian networks by appeal to the Kullbach-Leibler divergence between posterior generative and approximate recognition densities, and discuss a related measure of objective misrepresentation in terms of (lack of) correspondence with the facts.

Why should any body have a self?

by John Michael and Jakob Hohwy

We use a general computational framework for brain function to develop a theory of the self. The ... more We use a general computational framework for brain function to develop a theory of the self. The theory is that the self is an inferred model of endogenous, deeply hidden causes of behavior. The general framework for brain function on which we base this theory is that the brain is fundamentally an organ for prediction error minimization.There are three related parts to this project. In the first part (Sections 2-3), we explain how prediction error minimization must lead to the inference of a network of deeply hidden endogenous causes. The key concept here is that prediction error minimization in the long term approximates hierarchical Bayesian inference, where the hierarchy is critical to understand the place of the self, and the body, in the world. In the second part (Sections 4-5), we discuss why such a set of hidden endogenous causes should qualify as a self. We show how a comprehensive prediction error minimization account can accommodate key characteristics of the self. It turns out that, though the modelled endogenous causes are just some among other inferred causes of sensory input, the model is special in being, in a certain sense, a model of itself.
The third part (Sections 6-7) identifies a threat from such self-modelling: how can a self-model be accurate if it represents itself? We propose that we learn to be who we are through a positive feedback loop: from infancy onward, humans apply agent-models to understand what other agents are up to in their environment, and actively align themselves with those models. Accurate self-models arise and are sustained as a natural consequence of humans’ skill in modeling and interacting with each other.
The concluding section situates this inferentialist yet realist theory of the self with respect to narrative conceptions of the self.