Tim Bayne

Monash University, Philosophy, Faculty Member

I am a philosopher of mind and cognitive science at Monash University in Melbourne Australia.
Address: Philosophy
Room 4.027 Arthur Lewis Building
School of Social Science
University of Manchester
M13 9PL

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Books

Thought: A Very Short Introduction

The Unity of Consciousness

This book draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciou... more This book draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciousness is unified. In the first part I develop an account of what it means to say that consciousness is unified. Part II applies this account to a variety of cases - drawn from both normal and pathological forms of experience - in which the unity of consciousness is said to break down. I argue that the unity of consciousness remains intact in each of these cases. Part III explores the implications of the unity of consciousness for theories of consciousness, for the sense of embodiment, and for accounts of the self.

The Oxford Companion to Consciousness

* Complete coverage of over 250 concepts, helping the reader to get a sense of the whole fiel... more * Complete coverage of over 250 concepts, helping the reader to get a sense of the whole field
* Concise, to-the-point entries organized as a dictionary, enabling the reader in to find answers quickly and easily
* Extensively cross-referenced throughout, so that the reader can explore related concepts or findings
* Truly interdisciplinary, helping the reader to understand how the different fields interact

Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief-Formation

This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception. As patho... more This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception. As pathologies of belief, delusions and self-deception raise many of the same challenges for those seeking to understand them. Are delusions and self-deception entirely distinct phenomena, or might some forms of self-deception also qualify as delusional? To what extent might models of self-deception and delusion share common factors? In what ways do affect and motivation enter into normal belief-formation, and how might they be implicated in self-deception and delusion? The essays in this volume tackle these questions from both empirical and conceptual perspectives: some contributors focus on the general question of how to locate self-deception and delusion within our taxonomy of psychological states; some contributors ask whether particular delusions - such as the Capgras delusion or anosognosia for hemiplegia - might be explained by appeal to motivational and affective factors; and some contributors provide general models of motivated reasoning, against which theories of pathological belief-formation might be measured.

Papers

Dimensions of consciousness and the psychedelic state

Neuroscience of Consciousness

Tim Bayne

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